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Introduction
The abysmal failure of the Kyoto Protocol is best illustrated by
the single sentence that comprises the second paragraph of the Protocol's
third article: "[e]ach party included in Annex I shall, by 2005, have made
demonstrable progress in achieving its commitments under this
I.
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Protocol."' Presently, on the brink of January 1, 2005, the issue is not
whether the world's industrialized nations are making "demonstrable
progress" in reducing greenhouse gas emissions; rather, the issue is
whether the European Union (EU) can successfully convince Russia to
ratify the treaty to give it full force and effect.2 Without Russian
support
ratification, Kyoto will become a dead letter document, and EU
3
for implementing any of its provisions appears likely to falter.
Proponents of the Protocol may argue that a Russian ratification
would at least partially salvage the agreement. However, any attempt to
characterize the current situation as an opportunity for success is little
1 Conference to the Parties to the Framework Convention on Climate Change:
Kyoto Protocol to the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec.
10, 1997, art. 3, 37 I.L.M. 22, 33 [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol].
2 See Reuters, EU Firm on Climate Change, to Push Russia on Kyoto, N.Z.
at
Herald,
available
http://www.nzherald.co.nz/latestnewsstory.cftn?storylD=3552609&thesection=b
A Russian
usiness&thesubsection=latest (last visited Nov. 16, 2004).
ratification is necessary for an effective agreement because the United States
withdrew from negotiations. Id. The Kyoto Protocol requires fifty-five
ratifications by countries accounting for 55% of the total Annex I carbon dioxide
emissions as of 1990. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 1, at art. 25, para. 1. The
number of ratifications minus Russian acceptance falls short of the 55% goal by
10.8%. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Kyoto
Protocol Thermometer, at
http://unfccc.int/essential background/kyotoprotocol/status of ratification/ite
ms/3134txt.php (last modified Nov. 2, 2004) [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol
Thermometer].
3 Germany and Italy both indicated that Europe cannot afford greenhouse gas
reductions without greater universal participation. Lisa Jucca, Germany Raises
Policy,
Reuters,
at
Doubt
over
EU's
Kyoto
(on file
with
http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L26197834.htrn
University of Miami International & Comparative Law Review); Europe's Cold
Sweat over Kyoto, Christian Science Monitor (Mar. 30, 2004), at
http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/0330/p08s03-comv.html. Germany, however,
ultimately agreed to a "slight reduction." DW-World, Germany Makes EU
Deadline
for
C02
Plans,
at
http://www.dwworld.de/english/0,3367,1433 A 1157680 1 A,00.html (last visited Nov. 16,
2004). The number of European nations consenting to reductions independent
of Kyoto currently stands at five. Reuters, Five EU States Submit National C02
Emission Plans, availableat
(April 2,
http://www.planetark.com/dailynewsstory.cfn/newsid/24572/%20t
2004).
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more than a farce. Even if Russia joins the Protocol, three of the world's
largest greenhouse gas emitters - India, China, and the United States - as
well as every nation on the African continent, would not have to take part
in a problem that inherently demands a global response. Over half of the
greenhouse gases currently drifting into the upper reaches of the
atmosphere originate in nations that will be completely unregulated by
the Kyoto Protocol.4 Meanwhile, many of the nations willing to be
bound to Kyoto's strict emission standards will likely be unable to meet
their reduction requirements.5 If the requirements can be met, the
reduction levels are only binding for four years, between 2008 and 2012.6
Thus, the Kyoto Protocol's current effectiveness in slowing global
warming is far less than a drop in the bucket. It is a drop in the ocean.
The goal of this paper is not to lament the current state of the
Kyoto Protocol or to celebrate it. Instead, this paper will demonstrate
that the failure of the Kyoto Protocol is due to its necessary acceptance
of three highly contentious propositions. One must first accept that the
science underlying the Protocol is compelling. Then one must determine
that the Protocol is a scientifically legitimate response to the global
warming threat. Finally, one must conclude that the Protocol is more
economically palatable than inaction. This paper will delineate the
ongoing disputes over each of these issues and thereby illustrate why
2005 will not see the "demonstrable progress" in greenhouse gas
reductions called for by the Kyoto Protocol.
Proposition One: Global Warming is Due to the Increase of
Greenhouse Gas Emissions
The first step in understanding the debate over global warming is
parsing what is scientifically accepted from what is contested. Most
scientists accept the existence of a "greenhouse effect.",7 The debatable
II.

4 Greg Kahn, Between Empire and Community: The United States and

Multilateralism 2001-2003: A Mid-Term Assessment: Environment: The Fate of
the Kyoto Protocol Under the Bush Administration, 21 BERKELEY J. INT'L L.

548, 561 (2003).
5 Id.
at 556.
6 Kyoto Protocol, supra note 1, at art. 3, para. 1. While Kyoto flounders,
Finland is trying to garner support for expanding and extending its duration
beyond 2012. NewsRoom Finland, Finland Rallies Countries to Get Behind
Kyoto,
at
http://virtual.finland.fi/stt/showarticle.asp?intNWSAID=4021
&group=Politics (March 26, 2004).
7 See supra text 4-13.
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issue is whether humans are heightening this effect and, if so, to what
extent and with what consequences.
The greenhouse effect, originally hypothesized nearly 200 years
ago, 8 is a necessary and natural occurrence. It is caused by greenhouse
gases, such as carbon dioxide, which compose approximately 0.1% of
the earth's atmosphere. 9 These gases trap infrared radiation from the sun
and maintain the earth's surface temperature around 340 C above the
temperature that would exist were there no atmospheric greenhouse
gases.1 0 The presence of this greenhouse effect is largely undisputed as
are the indications of recent increases in carbon concentrations in the
earth's atmosphere." Ice core samples in Greenland and Antarctica
indicate that there is more carbon dioxide in the air now than at any point
in the past 420,000 years.' 2 These samples also indicate that carbon
dioxide concentrations have increased 30% since the dawn of the
industrial revolution,' 3 and methane concentrations are 150% above preindustrial levels. 14 These historic levels are due in large part to the
burning of fossil fuels, which release 6 billion metric tons of carbon
yearly.' 5 Hence, humans are releasing gases whose atmospheric
concentrations are known to have a warming effect on the earth.
8 WILLIAM
CLIMATE
IMPACTS].

R. COTTON & ROGER A. PIELKE, HUMAN IMPACTS ON WEATHER AND
161 (Cambridge University Press 1995) [hereinafter HUMAN
Swedish Professor, Svante Arrhenius, greatly improved upon the

theory and published a paper that posited a causal connection between increased
carbon dioxide concentrations and temperature increases in 1896. THOMAS G.
MOORE, CLIMATE OF FEAR: WHY WE SHOULDN'T WORRY ABOUT GLOBAL
WARMING 9 (1998) [hereinafter CLIMATE OF FEAR].
9 U.N. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE

2001: THE SCIENTIFIC BASIS 87 (2001). [hereinafter IPCC CLIMATE CHANGE].
10 DAVID G. VICTOR, THE COLLAPSE OF THE KYOTO PROTOCOL AND THE
STRUGGLE TO SLOW GLOBAL WARMING 119 (2001) [hereinafter COLLAPSE OF
KYOTO].

" Sherwood W. Wise, Jr., The Antarctic Ice Sheet: Rise and Demise?, 15 FLA.
& ENVTL. L. & FLA. ST. J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 383,

ST. U. J. LAND USE

385 (2000).
12 id.
13 WARWICK J. MCKIBBIN & PETER J. WILCOXEN, CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY
AFTER KYOTO: BLUEPRINT FOR A REALISTIC APPROACH 1 (2002) [hereinafter
CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY AFTER KYOTO].
'4 1d. at 10.

'5 Id. at

1.
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Additionally, there is a virtual consensus among scientists that
the earth's average surface temperature is 0.4 to 0.8 0 C warmer than it
was in 1860.16 One could easily assume a direct relationship between
this increase in temperature and the increase in greenhouse gas
emissions. However, the earth's climate system is far too complex to
assume a simple cause and effect relationship.' 7 Consequently, the
proponents and skeptics of anthropogenic climate change theorize the
relationship between these two observations quite differently.
The Proponents of Anthropogenic Global Warming
The basic premise of the proponents' argument is that human
activity has upset the energy balance of the natural greenhouse effect,
particularly by "the combustion of fossil fuels and deforestation."' 8 The
combustion of fossil fuels by cars, power plants, and other sources adds
carbon dioxide, methane, and other greenhouse gases to the
atmosphere.' 9 Meanwhile, deforestation weakens the planet's ability to
absorb carbon dioxide before it enters the upper reaches of the
atmosphere. z Chemicals such as carbon monoxide and nitrogen oxides,
while not greenhouse gases, react with other gases in the atmosphere to
create the greenhouse gas known as tropospheric ozone.2 '
Given these factors, proponents conclude that "the observed
change in global mean, annually averaged temperature over the last
century is unlikely to be due entirely to natural fluctuations of the climate
system," and it is the "forcing of greenhouse gases and sulphate
aerosols" that is responsible for this "climate response. 22 The Kyoto
A.

The IPCC and the National Academy of Sciences endorse this level of
warming. Id. at 27. A change in 10 C is equivalent to a 1.8' F change. Thus, the
average increase in temperature is around 1P F.
17A myriad of other variables factor into the equation. As one climatologist
stated, "the complexity of climate makes it impossible to know with any degree
of confidence" that the observed temperature changes are anthropogenic. Id. at
1.
18 IPCC CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 9, at 92.
16

'9 Id. at 92-93.
20

Id. at 193.

21 Id. at 92.
22

Id. at 97 (quoting the IPCC Second Assessment Report).
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Protocol is based on this premise.23 The perpetual addition of carbon
dioxide and other greenhouse gases creates an accumulation of layers in
the atmosphere that is similar to a person wearing increasingly more
layers of clothing on a sunny day. Kyoto aims to keep additional layers
from being added.24
The International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) deemed the
appropriate response to be the stabilization of carbon concentrations
through the Kyoto Protocol. The IPCC is a vast body of international
climatologists and meteorologists charged by the United Nations
Environment Program and the World Meteorological Organization in
1988 with the task of assessing the "available scientific and socioeconomic information on climate change. 25 The IPCC assembled
enough scientific data on climate to conclude in its 1996 "Second
Assessment Report" (SAR) that "[t]he balance of evidence suggests a
discernable human influence on global climate., 2 6 Since that report, new
research has caused some flux in the underlying data and theory,27 but
the principle conclusion remains the same.
The main challenge facing the IPCC was establishing a causal
connection between the increased concentrations of greenhouse gases
and the observed warming trends. Proving this correlation requires
splicing the anthropogenic influences on climate change from their
natural variability. 28 The IPCC report readily acknowledges that there
are "uncertainties in a number of factors, including the magnitude and
patterns of internal climate variability, external forcing and climate
system response.,, 29 However, they still maintain that the overwhelming
weight of evidence indicates that there is likely a human influence on the
climate's warming trend, and the accumulation of subsequent data has
23 J. Kevin Healy & Jeffrey M. Tapick, Climate Change: It's Not Just a Policy
Issue for Corporate Counsel - it's a Legal Problem, 29 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L.

89, 94 (2004) [hereinafter Climate Change: A Legal Problem]
24 See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 1.
25 IPCC CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 9, at vii.
26Id. at 10.
27 The most notable changes resulted from additional research concerning
aerosols. See id. at 291-335.
28 IPCC CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 9, at 697. Some scientists suggest that
this task may never be fully accomplished. HUMAN IMPACTS, supra note 8, at
200.
29
IPCC CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 9, at 697.
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only strengthened their conclusions. 30 Their current level of certainty is
"unlikely (bordering on very unlikely)"'3' that the warming of the past 3032
50 years is due to "internal climate variability.
The IPCC points to several sources to support the causal
connection between the anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions and the
apparent global temperature increases since 1950. 33 First, they dismiss
solar and volcanic forcing (i.e. an active sun and volcanic eruptions
heating the troposphere) as the warming culprits in the most recent
decades.34 Studies indicate a downward trend in both activities since the
middle parts of the twentieth century. 35 Accordingly, it would be
implausible that a decrease in forcing would result in the observed
increases in temperature.36 Without an obvious natural source on which
to pin causation, the IPCC turns to the issue of whether the recent global
warming trends are unusual for our planet.3 7 The IPCC concludes that
there is substantial evidence that rapid temperature change without
human causation has previously occurred during an interglacial period,
although the scale of these events was not global.38
Without a significant natural origin on which to pin causation
and a rate of temperature change of possibly historic proportions, the
IPCC focused on greenhouse gases. The National Academy of Sciences
Id. Among the "remaining uncertainties" are the effects of aerosols, volcanic
forcing, and solar signals. Id at 698.
31 "Unlikely" is a term of art indicating that there is a 10-33% chance, and "very
unlikely" indicates that there is a 1-10% chance. Id.at 2.
32 Id.at 698.
3' This time frame is important because skeptics of global warming generally
believe that the warmest year of the twentieth century occurred before 1950, and
changes since that time have been negligible. See supra text 8 and note 55.
34 IPCC CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 9, at 709, 380-85. A decrease in volcanic
activity actually could result in an increase in temperature because of the large
amount of sulphate aerosols produced by volcanic eruptions. See R.C.L.
30

WILSON ET AL., THE GREAT ICE AGE: CLIMATE CHANGE AND LIFE
[hereinafter CLIMATE CHANGE AND LIFE].
35
IPCC CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 9, at 709, 380-85.
36

142 (2000)

Id.

Id. at 130-36.
Id. at 142. One of these events, the "Medieval Warm Period" is specifically
dismissed by the IPCC as having "limited utility" in explaining the global
phenomenon, although global warming skeptics often cite it as evidence that
current warming trends are not anthropogenic. Id. at 135. See supra 9, for the
skeptics' discussion.
37
38
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estimates greenhouse gases to be at their highest level in 400,000 years. 39
The amount of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere has increased
exponentially from 280 parts per million (ppm) in 1800, to 397 ppm in
1999,40 because humans are increasingly forcing more gases into the
atmosphere than can be naturally absorbed by "carbon sinks" such as
forests and the ocean. 4' This increase in concentration causes the
naturally occurring greenhouse effect to retain larger amounts of heat,
and hence, global temperatures are rising.42 More recent IPCC studies
indicate that some of the warming has been and will be offset by the
release of sulphate aerosols, biomass burning, and mineral dust into the
atmosphere.43 However, the IPCC rates their "level of scientific
understanding" of these cooling factors to range from "low" to "very
44

loW."

The IPCC constructed a series of global climate models from
their collected data on each of these climate factors and different possible
These models predicted possible
economic growth patterns.4 5
temperature increases of 1.4 to 5.8 degrees Celsius between 1990 and
2100.46 Scientists estimate that such an increase could usher in sea level
rise between 0.09 and 0.88 meters, extreme seasonal variations in
climate, crop failures, and other negative global impacts.4 7 Developing
countries would likely experience the most difficulty in coping with the

39 Climate Change: A Legal Problem, supra note 23, at 90.
40 IpCC CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note
41Id. at 193.
42

9, at 187.

Id. at 55-56.

Id. at 9. These compounds are believed to have a cooling effect. Id.
Id. at 37. The Technical Summary in Climate Change 2001: The Scientific
Basis, fails to define the terms "low" and "very low." See Id. at 21-83.
However, "low" was equated to a "5-33%" confidence level, and "very low"
was equated to a "5% or less" confidence level in an earlier publication. See
U.N. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2001.
available
at
24
and
Vulnerability
Adaptation,
Impacts,
(February
http://www.grida.no/climate/ipcc tar/wg2/pdf/wg2TARtechsunpdf
43
44

2001) [hereinafter IPCC: Impacts, Adaptation,and Vulnerability].
9, at 473-512.
46 Id. at 13.
45 IPCC CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note

Id. at 15-16. The extent of damage caused by these factors are discussed
supra text 25-26.
47
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impact of these changes.48 The IPCC further estimates that these effects
will remain centuries after atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations
are stabilized. 49 Therefore, the threat requires immediate action, and
although more research is needed, 50 proponents of the anthropogenic
global warming theory argue that the stakes 5 are
too great to wait for
1
action.
taking
before
evidence
conclusive
more
B.

The Skeptics of Anthropogenic Global Warming
Despite the espoused consensus on anthropogenic influence on
climate change, a significant number of scientists remain unconvinced by
the IPCC report. In fact, 17,000 scientists signed a statement in 1998
that attested to their skepticism of the science underlying the Kyoto
Protocol. 2 Some speculate that even more scientists would challenge the
theory, but many are reluctant because they believe "only good can come
from attempts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. 5 3 The skeptics
generally argue three points in refuting the conclusions of the IPCC: (1)
it is currently impossible to distinguish natural warming from
anthropogenic warming, (2) the computer models promulgated by the
IPCC are severely flawed, and (3) even if there is a minimal increase in
average surface temperature, humans would not suffer.
48

Matthew Vespa, Climate Change 2001: Kyoto at Bonn and Marrakech, 29

ECOLOGY
L.Q. 395, 397 (2002) [hereinafter Kyoto at Bonn and Marrakech].
49
IPCC CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 9, at 17.
50
51

id.
One scholar compares our current situation to the Titanic cruising towards an

iceberg. Symposium, An Assessment of the Kyoto Protocol Transcript from
Panel Discussion April 15, 1999, 11 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 767, 778
(1999) [hereinafter Kyoto Panel Discussion]; see also COLLAPSE OF KYOTO,

supra note 10, at 121 (arguing that the consequences could be equally
catastrophic for developed nations as it will be for their developing
counterparts); cf Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the PrecautionaryPrinciple, 151 U.

PA. L. REV. 1003, 1027-28, 1044-54 (2003) (arguing that changing behavior
because of a mere possible outcome often makes little economic sense). The
purported costs and severity of the global warming damages are discussed supra
text 19-26.
52 Kyoto Panel Discussion, supra note 51, at 772. This "Oregon Petition" is not
the only one of its kind. See Lakshman Guruswamy, Climate Change: The Next
Dimension, 15 FLA. ST. U. J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. & FLA. ST. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 341, 352 n.58 (2000) [hereinafter Climate Change:
The Next Dimension].
53
HUMAN IMPACTS, supra note 8, at 160.
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Scientific data demonstrates a considerable amount of
fluctuation in weather temperatures over the past 1,000 years. Though
the twentieth century was the warmest century of the past 600 years, it
was not the warmest century when compared to 1000 AD.14 Skeptics

point to the "Little Climate Optimum," which lasted from 800 AD to
around 1200 or 1300 AD," as evidence that current temperatures are not
unseasonably warm when reviewing the broad historical record. 6 This
period was warm enough for the Vikings to settle and grow crops on the
currently frozen wastelands of Greenland.57 The Climate Optimum was
followed by a 600-year "Little Ice Age," which ended with a steep
warming trend that began in 1850, recessed between 1940 and 1975, and
now may be resuming.58 In light of this climate change occurring before
and during the large-scale human addition of greenhouse gases to the
atmosphere, it is erroneous to assume that the recent warming trend is the
result of human activity without additional scientific evidence.59
Skeptics purport that the myriad of natural factors glossed over
by the IPCC exhibit the fallacy of assuming that the observed climate
Of these factors, the most
change is necessarily anthropogenic.
egregious lack of understanding is with respect to clouds, solar
does not
gases. 60 between
The IPCC
and life orcycle
of greenhouse
variability,
temperature
understand
the relationship
adequately address

Kyoto Panel Discussion, supra note 51, at 771-72.

This information is
discemable from tree rings and ice core samples. Id. at 771-73.
55
CLIMATE OF FEAR, supra note 8, at 46.
56
54

Kyoto PanelDiscussion, supra note 51, at 772.

Id. The IPCC discounts this period as a regional, not a global, phenomenon.
CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 9, at 142. The skeptics, however, argue
that the phenomenon was global, though not simultaneous, and cite evidence of
expanded agricultural activities that took place during this period in South and
Central America. CLIMATE OF FEAR, supra note 8, at 59-61. Japan and China
purportedly experienced their own "Climate Optimum," but theirs began around
800 AD and ended around 1000 AD. Id. at 48, 57-58.
57

IPCC

58

S.

FRED

SINGER,

HOT TALK,

COLD

SCIENCE:

GLOBAL

WARMING'S

33 (1997) [hereinafter HOT TALK].
One scholar considers any statement of certainty that global warming is the
result of human activity as an "extremely anthropogenic" statement. HUMAN
IMPACTS, supra note 8, at 202.
60 Other factors include water vapor, vegetative feedback, and ocean feedback.

UNFINISHED DEBATE
59

See id. at 169-175.
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and cloud cover.6' Meteorological studies indicate that the increased
low-level cloud cover due to the evaporation of ocean waters from the
initial warming temperatures could significantly offset any warming
trends. 62 In addition, the IPCC admits that the current "level of scientific
understanding" of the sun's "total solar irradiance" is "very low.",63 This
lack of understanding could seriously undermine IPCC predictions,
because the past 100 years witnessed a strikingly strong correlation
between the sunspot cycle and average global surface temperature. 64 The
greater the solar activity, the warmer temperatures have been. 6' Another
factor the IPCC does not adequately consider is the life cycle of
greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. 66 While it is known that 40% of the
carbon dioxide forced into the atmosphere stays there, too little is known
about the length of its atmospheric life and the fate of the 60% that does
not remain aloft. 67 The IPCC simply does not know enough about
clouds, solar variability, or carbon's atmospheric life cycle to construct
accurate global climate models.68
Skeptics also express misgivings about the significant
discrepancy between satellite and surface temperature data. 69 Readings
from surface temperature stations indicate rising temperatures while
satellite readings indicate stagnant temperatures.7 ° The IPCC discounts
this discrepancy as unimportant because the two systems measure
separate layers of the atmosphere. 7' However, their position will become
untenable if the temperature divide widens over time because an air
volume cannot maintain a stagnant temperature while resting upon a

supra note 58, at 51 (quoting the IPCC science panel's statement
that "[c]loud behavior is the 'single biggest uncertainty' and that "[r]esearchers
cannot be certain whether (clouds) speed warming or slow it").
62 Id. at 50; HUMAN IMPACTS, supra note 8, at 180.
63 IPCC CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 9, at 382.
64 HOT TALK, supra note 58, at 7, 55.
65 id.
66
Id. at 61.
61 HOT TALK,

67

68

Id.
See HUMAN

IMPACTS,

supra note 8, at 128-13 1.

69

HOT TALK, supra note 58, at

70

id.

12.

supra note 9, at 120. Satellites measure the
stratosphere, which is the region directly above the troposphere, which is
measured by surface instruments. Id.
7' IPCC CLIMATE CHANGE,
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warming air volume.72 The skeptics attribute the difference to the "urban
heat island effect" - an effect acknowledged by the IPCC but purportedly
underestimated.73 This phenomenon explains that data provided by
temperature recording stations near populated areas are skewed to be
significantly higher.74 As all New Yorkers know, downtown New York
City is noticeably warmer than the suburbs of Long Island, which are in
turn warmer than the farmland in the Catskills. Other temperature
measurement irregularities exacerbate the problematic urban heat island
effect. These include the lack of uniformity in temperature gathering
methods and the dearth of ocean surface temperature measurement
(recalling that only one third of the earth is land).7 5 Skeptics thus
conclude that the IPCC's determination that the earth warmed during the
latter half of the century is speculation. If one correctly adjusts surface
temperature measurements to properly take into account the "urban heat
island" effect, the years around 1940 - not the mid-1990's - become the
warmest of the century for both the US and Europe.76
Scientists skeptical of the IPCC's conclusions surmise that the
anthropogenic warming threat is a mere paper tiger. They assert that
IPCC predictions on global warming over the next century are
irreparably flawed because the global climate models fail to adequately
take a series of crucial factors into account. These climate models are
crude instruments that merely speculate what may happen, and scientists
may still be decades away from sufficiently understanding weather
systems and global climate change to attribute it to anthropogenic
note 58, at 12, 45-48. However, this gap in temperature
may be exactly what is happening, as evidenced by the increases in precipitation
observed in the United States over the past years. See Patrick J. Michaels,
Drought-InspiredClimate Panic, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2002, (providing that
"[i]f the surface warms while the air above does not, the surface air is more
buoyant, and that will increase precipitation intensity" and that "U.S.
precipitation has increased about 10% over the [twentieth] century, an increase
of around [three] inches in the last 100 years") available at
http://www.cato.org/research/articles/michaels-020916.html (last visited Nov.
17, 2004).
71 See IPCC CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 9, at 94, 106, 163. This phenomenon
is factored into their global climate models. Id. at 94.
72

HOT TALK, supra

74 HOT TALK,

supra note 58, at 12; See also PATRICK J.

MICHAELS, SOUND AND

FURY: THE SCIENCE AND POLITICS OF GLOBAL WARMING 45-49

71 Id. at 43-51.
76 HOT TALK, supra note 58,

at 12.

(1992).
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factors.77 The skeptics realize, however, that these assertions may not be
enough to convince one adhering to the precautionary principle.7 8 The
skeptics thus continue that even the disastrous implications of a warmer
earth are simply imaginary.
Most prevalently, the skeptics oppose assertions that the increase
in greenhouse gas concentrations necessarily leads to agricultural failures
and ocean level increases. Studies indicate that plants grow significantly
faster in a carbon dioxide enriched environment.7 9 It follows that an
influx of greenhouse gases creates more robust vegetation. 0 The modest
levels of temperature increase predicted by the IPCC would also likely
extend the growing season and reduce the occurrence of plant-damaging
frosts during the growing season. 81 Therefore, the greenhouse effect will
have a positive influence on agricultural harvests much in the same way
that the warmer temperatures of the "Little Climate Optimum" helped
agriculture, 2 only this time, there is the added benefit of a carbon
enriched atmosphere. Additional studies indicate that proponents of the
global warming theory overstate the doomsday levels of ocean rising. 83
These studies provide that the earth's waters will not rise because
increased levels of evaporation from the ocean would transfer to the

" Singer agrees with leading scientists that say it will be "a decade before
computer models can confidently link the warming to human activities." Kyoto
Panel Discussion, supra note 51, at 772-73. Others believe it will take many
decades to assert a causal connection. HUMAN IMPACTS, supra note 8, at 202.
78 The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development provides a widely
accepted definition of the precautionary principle. It provides: "[i]n order to
protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely applied by
States according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or
irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason
for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation."
U.N. Environment Program, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development,
Principle 15, available at
http://www.unep.org/Documents/Default. asp?Document
163.
ID=78&ArticlelD=1
79
HUMAN IMPACTS, supra note 8, at 181-82.
80 Id.
8

2

1

83

HOT TALK, supra note 58, at 19, 58-59.

Id. at 17.

Id. at 18-19, 57-58.
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polar ice caps.14 This transfer would thicken the ice caps enough to
85
offset any melting due to temperature increases.
Skeptical scientists thus mistrust the science underlying the
IPCC anthropogenic global warming predictions and the alleged severe
consequences that would follow. Despite this skepticism, most scientists
seem to agree that reducing greenhouse gas emissions and becoming
more energy efficient is a good idea. 6 They disagree, however, with the
IPCC allegation that such reductions necessarily would have an impact
on climate change, because scientific data has simply not reached a point
where one can confidently link human activities with climate change.
Proposition Two: The Kyoto Protocol is a Scientifically
Legitimate Response to the Threat of Anthropogenic
Climate Change
The Kyoto Protocol embodies the legal response to the global
warming threat.8 7 This response has proven to be just as, if not more,
controversial than the problem it addresses. The subject of most
criticisms of Kyoto's text can be categorized as either scientific or
economic. Before considering these attacks and their responses, the
substantive provisions of the Protocol must first be analyzed.
Article 3 contains the central terms of the Kyoto Protocol. This
article requires the industrialized nations listed in Annex I of the
agreement to reduce "their overall emissions by at least 5% below 1990
levels in the commitment period [of] 2008 to 2012. "88 The obligated
countries may use 1995 levels of hydroflourocarbons, perflorocarbons,
I.

84

Id. The IPCC agrees that the "Antarctic sheet is likely to gain mass," but they

believe the Greenland sheet will "lose mass because the increase in runoff will
exceed the precipitation increase." IPCC CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 9, at 16.
85 HOT TALK, supra note 58, at 19, 58-59. Singer admits that the data is "rather
limited" on the correlation between sea level rise and ice accumulation in
Greenland and Antarctica, although he does not qualify the data supporting the
inverse relationship between tropical sea-surface temperature and sea level rise.
Id. at 18-19.
86 Id. at 44; see BJORN LOMBERG, THE SKEPTICAL ENVIRONMENTALIST:
MEASURING THE REAL STATE OF THE WORLD, 322-23 (2001); see HUMAN
IMPACTS, supra note 8, at 160.
87 See Climate Change: The Next Dimension, supra note 52, at 355-58, for a
succinct summary of the interim agreements and negotiating battles that led to
the Kyoto Protocol.
88 Kyoto Protocol, supra note 1, at art. 3, para. 1.
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and sulphur hexafluoride as the baseline for their reduction
The Climate Change Secretariat equated these
commitments.8 9
obligations to approximately a 30% reduction of Annex I output levels if
no action were taken. 90
This overall net reduction will be achieved through varying
emission reduction requirements for each individual country.9' For
example, the agreement requires the U.S. to attain a 7% reduction;
Germany, an 8% reduction; and allows a 1% increase for Norway.92
Developing nations do not have any binding obligations to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions.93 Instead, Article 10 encourages these nations
to monitor and reduce greenhouse gas emissions "to the extent possible"
with the aid of developed nations and through the implementation of
"clean

development mechanisms,

'94

which give developed nations

reduction credits for projects that reduce emissions in developing
countries. 95 Through this clean development mechanism, developing
nations receive cleaner and more efficient industrial technology at the
expense of industrialized nations, and the Annex I nations gain a costeffective alternative to reaching all of their emission reductions
independently.9 6
The clean development mechanism was one of several
provisions convention delegates negotiated to help ease the
89

Id. at art. 3, para. 8.

90 Brendan P. McGivem, Introductory Note to Kyoto Protocol, supra note 1,
reprintedin 37 I.L.M. at 24 n.5.

Kyoto Protocol, supra note 1, at art. 3, para. 1. Such a system is known as
"common but differentiated responsibility." Climate Change: The Next
91

Dimension, supra note 52, at 356.
92 Kyoto Protocol, supra note 1, at Annex B.

Id. at art. 3. "Developing" is at times a bit of a misnomer, given the inclusion
of South Korea and its thirteenth largest economy in the world. Sangim Shim,
93

Korea's Leading Role in Joining the Kyoto Protocol with the Flexibility
Mechanisms as "Side Payments", 15 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 203, 205
(2003) [hereinafter Korea's Leading Role].

Kyoto Protocol, supra note 1, art. 10, 12. The lack of obligations for the
developing countries was a major reason cited by the Bush administration when
94

rejecting the Protocol. Kyoto at Bonn and Marrakech, supra note 48, at 406-07.
95 Kyoto Protocol, supra note 1, art. 12, para. 3.
96 See Korea's Leading Role, supra note 93, at 213-15. The Protocol does not

allow Annex I nations to receive all of their reduction credits through this
mechanism. Id.
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implementation of the Protocol's obligations for the Annex I nations.
Other provisions included an emission trading system, an allowance for
considering carbon uptake capabilities, and a "joint implementation"
provision. Perhaps the most controversial flexibility provision is the
emission trading mechanism. Article 17 provides that obligated nations
"may participate in emissions trading for the purposes of fulfilling their
commitments under Article 3 of this Protocol. 9 7 The details of this
provision were left largely undefined and only indicate that a country
that surpasses its reduction obligations may sell its remaining emission
volume to another country unable to achieve its reduction obligation.9 8
In addition, the Protocol factors the carbon uptake capabilities, or
"carbon sinks," of the individualized nations into their emission
reductions.99 Because of this provision, a nation need not achieve its
reductions purely through output reduction and may include
"reforestation" and "afforestation."' 100
Another aspect of the Protocol, the "joint implementation"
provision, operates similarly to the clean development mechanism.
Through this Article 6 provision, an Annex I state may acquire or
transfer "emission reduction units resulting from projects aimed at
reducing anthropogenic emissions by sources or enhancing
anthropogenic removals by sinks of greenhouse gases" to another Annex
I state.' 1 The exact function of this10 2Article 6 provision was left to be
determined "as soon as practicable.',
These substantive provisions of the Kyoto Protocol have been
the subject of intense scientific scrutiny and debate since the Protocol's
Kyoto Protocol, supra note 1, art. 17.
98 Id. For a discussion of the mechanical problems associated with a trading
scheme and methods of ensuring compliance, see Brett Frischmann, Using the
97

Multi-Layered Nature of InternationalEmissions Trading and of InternationalDomestic Legal Systems to Escape a Multi-State Compliance Dilemma, 12 GEO.
INT'L ENVTL. L. REv. 463 (2001).
99 Kyoto Protocol, supra note 1, art. 3, para 3.
100 Id. Afforestation is the "the direct human-induced conversion of land that has
not been forested for a period of 50 years to forest land through planting,
seeding and/or the human-induced promotion of natural seed sources." U.N.
Framework Convention on Climate Change, Review of Implementation of
Commitments and of Other Provisions of the Convention 5 available at
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/cop6secpart/02a03r01.pdf (Oct. 27, 2003).
lo Id. at art. 6, para. 1.
'02
Id. at art. 6, para. 2.
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adoption in December of 1997.
The views on the Protocol's
effectiveness range from insignificant to earth-saving effects. Most
scholars agree, however, that the U.S. withdrawal greatly reduced its
likely impact, because
the U.S. accounts for approximately 36.1% of the
10 3
emissions.
I
Annex
A.

The Kyoto Protocol is a Scientifically Legitimate
Response
Those who consider the Kyoto Protocol a scientifically
legitimate response argue that one cannot consider the Protocol in
isolation. 0 4 It is not a final solution to anthropogenic climate change; it
is a necessary first step from the wealthiest of nations. 105 Some speculate
that subsequent treaties will include additional measures for developing
nations to implement.'0 6 Frank Loy, the Under Secretary of State for
Global Affairs with the Clinton Administration summarized this view:
[S]tanding alone, the Kyoto targets would represent little
more than a momentary pause along a steep path of
rising global emissions. The importance of the Kyoto
Protocol, therefore, lies less in the initial emission
reduction numbers than in the structural elements of its
climate change regime. I refer to the decisions to include
a basket of the six major greenhouse gases rather than
just carbon; a multiyear commitment period rather than a
single target year; and activities that take carbon out of
the air and store it in the ground, commonly called
carbon sequestration or sinks.'0 7

103
104

Kyoto Protocol Thermometer, supra note 2.
See Frank E. Loy, The United States Policy on the Kyoto Protocol and

Climate Change, 15 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 152 (2001) [hereinafter US
Policy on Kyoto]; Daniel A. Farber, Building Bridges over Troubled Waters.
Eco-Pragmatismand the Environmental Prospect, 87 MINN L. REV. 851, 868

(2003) ("We have not yet succeeded in averting this particular 'tragedy of the
commons,' but we have made more progress than might have been expected.").
105 US Policy on Kyoto, supra note 104, at 155.
106 See id.
"'7Id. at 152.
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According to Loy, it is improper to get wrapped up in a debate as to
Kyoto's direct scientific impact on global warming.1 °8 Consistent with
the precautionary principle, nations must act immediately and then
tighten the noose around the neck of global warming as better data
fosters improvements to the mechanisms in place. In the meantime,
there will be notable benefits with respect to emissions and sustainable
development.
Proponents of the Protocol point to the simple fact that Kyoto
will equate to real reductions in emissions. 10 9 Compliance proceedings
developed at convention meetings in Bonn and Marrakech strengthened
this point."0 Under these new mechanisms, nations will face actual
penalties for failing to comply, such as revoking emission selling rights
and forcing violators to develop a "compliance action plan.""' The
proceedings allow for many nations, including island states with a strong
interest in a successful Protocol, to participate in monitoring activities.12
Thus, even if the reduction commitments are not as significant as hoped,
they are still substantive and will result in less greenhouse gases than if
there were no Kyoto Protocol.
Developing countries will reap secondary benefits from the
Currently, these countries are
implementation of the Protocol.
industrializing without utilizing available clean technology." 3 Through
Kyoto's clean development mechanism, Annex I nations will receive
emission reduction credit for implementing the use of clean technology
in countries such as Paraguay, Argentina, and Thailand. 1 4 Therefore,
Kyoto will further sustainable development by improving the immediate
environment of such developing nations, because clean technology will
spread to areas of the world where it would not otherwise be employed.

108

See id.

109 See id.

110 Kyoto at Bonn and Marrakech, supra note 48, at 413-16. These meetings

occurred after the U.S.'s withdrawal. Id. at 397-98.
...
Id.at 413-16.
112

Id.
113US Policy on Kyoto,supra note 104, at 155.

See U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Status of Ratification,
at http://unfccc.int/resource/kpstats.pdf (last modified Oct. 5,2004).
114
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B.

The Kyoto Protocol is Not a Scientifically Legitimate
Response
The Kyoto Protocol, like most compromises, received criticisms
from both sides of the debate. Some environmentalists viewed Kyoto as
merely a symbolic document with virtually no substantive impact. 115
Greenpeace initially labeled it as a "tragedy and a farce." ' 1 6 Skeptical
scientists criticized Kyoto for the minimal amounts of warming it will
likely avoid and the potentially negative effect the agreement will have
on developing nations.
Kyoto's critics argue that even if all of Kyoto's obligations were
met, its effects would be negligible. The middle range global climate
model of the IPCC predicts 1.4 degrees Celsius of warming to occur by
2050.117 A perfectly followed Kyoto would equate to an avoidance of
1/20 of a degree under that model." 8 Climatologists estimate that
Kyoto's emission reductions would need to be 40 - 50% greater to
actually stabilize the greenhouse gas-induced warming. 19 It follows that
the Kyoto Protocol fails to substantively curb emissions or warming.
At the heart of the debate over Kyoto's scientific legitimacy are
developing nations, which helped negotiate the document, but are not
required to curb emissions under it. This lack of obligation seems
nonsensical, because developing nations are quickly becoming primary
emitters of greenhouse gases. 120 Recent estimates tag developing nations
as the source for 44% of the global fossil fuel emissions. 121 The
increases in carbon concentrations due to the large amounts of
115 See

Richard N. Cooper, The Kyoto Protocol: A Flawed Concept, 31 ENVTL.

L. REP. 11484 (2001) [hereinafter Kyoto: A Flawed Concept].
116 Steinar Andersen, The Development of the Climate Regime: Positions,
Evaluation, and Lessons, Columbia International

www.ciaonet.org/wps/ansOl/ansOl.html

Affairs Online,

, at

(January 1998), quoted in Laura

Thorns, A ComparativeAnalysis of InternationalLegal Regimes on Ozone and
Climate Change with Implications for Regime Design, 41 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 795, 821 (2003).
117 Kyoto
118 Id.

Panel Discussion,supra note 51, at 777.

'19 Kyoto at Bonn andMarrakech, supra note 48, at 419. Some estimate that the

emission reductions may be even less significant because of recent carbon sink
concessions made to Russia. Id. at 419-20 ("Concessions made on sinks alone
lower the Protocol's ability to cut emissions from its goal of 5.2% to 1.8%.").
120 Kyoto: A Flawed Concept, supra note 115, at 11486.
121 US Policy on Kyoto, supra note 104, at 155.

U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP.

L. REV.

VOL. 13

deforestation and other land use changes now occurring in developing
nations are actual but less quantifiable. 12 2 Those critical of Kyoto thus
maintain that the solution to the climate change threat must include
developing nations to be legitimate. However, developing nations
largely face uncertain futures, which makes substantive involvement in
future agreements spawned by the 2 3United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change unlikely.
Kyoto's critics also fear that the developing nations will be
harmed by the agreement because it undermines sustainable
development. 2 4 The Protocol fails to guide developing nations on the
most economically feasible and environmentally conscious path, and
undermines the ability of future generations to utilize their natural
resources.2 5 These critics argue that "[b]y exempting developing
countries from any form of self restraint, they have been freed and
authorized to pollute by relying on as much fossil fuel energy as they
may choose."' 126 For example, China, which is without any obligation to
reduce greenhouse gas emissions, is on track to produce 40% of the
world's greenhouse gas emissions by 2025.127 China's inefficient use of
coal power in energy production will create this increase. 128 Their coal
burning facilities are on average six times less efficient than US plants
and often burn an environmentally harmful sulfur-rich coal, which causes
a myriad of health problems. 12 9 Under Kyoto, China will continue to
industrially develop without any obligation to protect the local or global
environment. 30 This agreement allows China and other developing
nations to achieve economic success at the expense of- as opposed to in
keeping with - environmental health. The agreement is therefore at
tension with the principles of sustainable development while failing to
achieve any real impact on climate change.

122 id.

supra note 13, at 57-5 8.
Climate Change. The Next Dimension, supra note 52, at 359-62.

123 CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY AFTER KYOTO,
124
125

See id.

126

Id. at 363.

127Id.
128
129

Id.
Id. at 363-64. These health problems include "nausea, dizziness, lung cancer,

bronchitis, pneumonia, and asthma." Id. at 364.
30Id. at 363-64
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Proposition Three: The Kyoto Protocol is More
Economically Palatable Than Inaction
One fact becomes clear when analyzing the economic impact of
the Kyoto Protocol: carbon dioxide is a crucial component of every
economy in the world. This gas is truly "at the heart of modern
economics, which depend intimately on productive agriculture and
[inanimate] sources of energy.' 3' The issue of the Protocol's economic
impact, therefore, is not whether there will be one; the issue is whether it
will be too severe to merit ratification. The answer to this inquiry may
vary significantly from nation to nation. Nations such as Great Britain,
which would have to continue its current movement away from nuclear
power without burning more fossil fuels, 132 will have a more severe
economic impact than Russia, whose economic downswing and crafty
negotiating made its goals achievable without any action. 133 However, if
Kyoto leads to an avoidance of massive agricultural failures and deadly
ocean rise, then a successful Protocol would positively impact every
nation's economy regardless of the immediate costs.
IV.

The Economic Impact is Too Severe
The critics of the Kyoto Protocol complain that the agreement is
too economically inefficient to merit ratification. They primarily argue
that the rigid 2010 goal is too soon and that the emissions trading scheme
is unworkable in the international sphere. These efficiency problems are
further exacerbated by the uncertainty of the extent of damages the
agreement will avoid. Thus, the agreement's costs are known to be high,
but its value is purely speculative.
The Kyoto Protocol sets an impending 2008 target for the
reduction of carbon emissions. 34 Critics argue that this deadline is far
too imminent. 3 Instead of meeting a rigid short-term closing date, it
A.

131
Kyoto: A Flawed Concept, supra 115, at 11489.

The UK's return to coal burning caused greenhouse gas emissions to rise 2%
in 2003. Increase in UK Greenhouse Gas Emissions, Sustainable Development
International, at http://www.sustdev.org/ industry.news/2004/01.04.04.html.
133 Kyoto at Bonn and Marrakech, supra note 48, at 403.
134Kyoto Protocol, supra note 1, at art. 3, para. 1.
135 See Climate Change: The Next Dimension, supra note 52, at 369-70. See
Michael F. Duffy, Prometheus Re-bound: How Adoption of the Kyoto Protocol
on Climate Change would Devastate the Western US. Coal Industry 77 DENV.
U. L. REv. 265, 275-86 (1999), for a summary of the deadline's projected
impact on the U.S. economy.
132
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would be better to gradually phase out inefficient equipment and
processes. 13 6 A later deadline would allow energy saving equipment to
naturally replace
old equipment instead of requiring inefficient
13 7
"retrofitting."'

The emissions trading system - the supposed economic saving
grace of Kyoto - will also prove unworkable. The Protocol fails to
address the situation created by the economically induced greenhouse
gas reductions. Some countries, particularly the Ukraine and Russia,
whose growth in emissions was significantly offset by economic
downturn, may be able to receive a windfall through emission trading
because the growth was overestimated.138 The U.S. withdrawal from
negotiations worsened the situation. Russia's increased bargaining
power enabled it to negotiate a greater allowance of carbon sinks that
count towards their emission reductions, from 17.6 million tons of
carbon per year to 33 million tons per year. 39 Despite this economic
potential, Russia is reluctant to ratify the Protocol. 140 This inaction may
be evidence that David Victor, a commentator critical of the emission
trading scheme, was correct when he predicted in 2001 that "[t]he next
rounds will prove Kyoto to have been an aberration - the imaginary can
opener, not proof that it is feasible to hand out and secure assets worth
trillions of dollars under international law.' 141 This "aberration" is due to
the speculative nature of emission fluxes and a general mistrust of an
international property right. 42 If Russia, a country that stands to gain
from the economic potential of emissions trading, is reluctant to join the

136

Climate Change: The Next Dimension, supra note 52, at 369.

37
3' 8 Id.

at 370.

1 Kyoto at Bonn and Marrakech, supra note
39

48, at 408-09.

Id. at 410.
140 Colby Cosh, You can Stick a Fork in Kyoto, NAT'L POST, Apr. 2,
2004
(stating that President Putin's economic advisors believe that the short term
benefits of joining Kyoto will be less than the economic loss it will ultimately
create),
available
at
http://www.canada.com/national/nationalpost/columnists/story.html?id-b45c57c
3-7046-4091-b099-3a8bb35f8fed (on file with the University of Miami
International & Comparative Law Review) (ANOTHER DEAD LINK). One
estimate places Russia's potential windfall at around $750 million. COLLAPSE
OF KYOTO, supra note 10, at 9.
141 Id. at 29.
142 Id. at 11.
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Protocol, then one should not be surprised that other nations without such
potential are unwilling to join.
The uncertain level of global warming risk and the monetary
damages that would follow aggravates the uneasiness surrounding the
economic mechanics of the agreement. Predicting 100 years of emission
levels is extremely difficult. 4 a The large range of scenarios predicted by
the IPCC proves this difficulty. 44 Will the atmospheric carbon levels be
75% or 350% above pre-industrial levels? 145 Will the average surface
temperature be 1.4 degrees or 5.8 degrees above 1990 levels? 46 Because
the IPCC does not claim that one prediction is more probable than the
other, 147 answers to these questions are unknown. The IPCC also does
not claim to know the levels of economic damages given actual climate
change. They only have "medium' 48 confidence that the "aggregate
market-sector impacts" of a small temperature increase will be "plus or
minus a few percent" of the world's gross domestic product.149 Thus, the
world could gain a net benefit of a few trillion dollars or experience a
loss of a few trillion if the temperature increase is on the lower end of the
global climate model scale.' ° The IPCC does not know. It follows that
because the value 5of Kyoto is in the damages it would avoid, its true
value is unknown. '

The speculative nature of the possible damages caused by global
climate change highlights the costs associated with implementing the
agreement. The costs of reaching Kyoto's targets also involve a level of
speculation, although they share a common large price tag.'1 2 One study
' CLIMATE

CHANGE POLICY AFTER KYOTO, supra note

13, at 28.

144"d.

141 See
146

id.

See id.

147 See IPCC CLIMATE

CHANGE, supra note 9, at 13.
"Medium" represents a "confidence level" of "33-67%." IPCC: Impacts,
Adaptation, and Vulnerability, supra note 44, at 24.
149 Id. at 70 (emphasis added). In these estimates, the IPCC does not "consider
potentially important factors such as changes in extreme events, advantageous
and complementary responses to the threat of non-climate-driven extreme
events, rapid change in regional climate (e.g., resulting from changes in ocean
circulation), compounding effects of multiple stresses, or conflicting or
complementary reaction to those stresses." Id.
148

'

50

See id.

151 See

CLIMATE CHANGE

.2Id. at 38.

POLICY AFTER KYOTO, supra note

13, at 52.
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estimates that the United States would spend approximately 1.4% of 1its
53
gross domestic product by 2010 in efforts to reach its goal.
Meanwhile, Japan and the EU would spend 0.8%.154 Another study
indicates that the worldwide costs would fall between $800-1,500 billion
with perfectly efficient implementation, and the benefits would be $120
billion. 155 Yet another estimate places the costs at $1.5 trillion. 5 6 Given

these economic uncertainties, opponents argue that a fiscally sensible
government should not ratify the Kyoto Protocol.
B.

The Economic Impact is Not Too Severe
Supporters of the Kyoto Protocol generally respond to concerns
over its economic impact with three arguments. First, they reason that
there is significant value in the damages avoided. Next, they assert that
the flexibility of the agreement will allow the economic burden to be
relatively light. Lastly, they maintain that Kyoto presents significant
benefits that cannot be calculated economically, but nevertheless offset
the Protocol's costs.
The value of the Protocol is in the climate change damages
avoided by its implementation. Proponents of Kyoto understand that
while the costs of implementing such agreements may be estimated
through various means, the economic benefits are inherently difficult to
measure. 57 They argue that this difficulty does not indicate that benefits
do not exist; instead, a variety of benefits arise in direct and indirect
forms.' 58 An example of this theory is easily demonstrated through the
Clean Water Act (CWA). 5 9 The CWA burdens industries with the costs
of controlling the amount of pollution they discharge into rivers and
streams.
However, these costs in the aggregate are offset by the
avoided direct damages to the water and by the fishing and recreational
activities that either would not occur or would occur less frequently if the
pollution was not controlled. 161
153

Id.

154 id.

151 Id. at 52.
15 6 Id. at 53.
157 THE NEW PALGRAVE:

et. al. eds.,
158

Id.

159 Federal

A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 162-63 (John Eatwell

1991) [hereinafter PALGRAVE DICTIONARY].
Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2000).

160

See id.

161

See PALGRAVE

DICTIONARY,

supra note 157, at 162.
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Similarly, the Kyoto Protocol pays for a "stream of damages"
before they occur. 162 It would be shortsighted to assume that the
agreement is not economically palatable without first considering the
extent of damages it would possibly avoid. Support already exists for the
theory that global warming causes ocean level rise and crop failures. A
recent study indicates that achieving an atmospheric carbon dioxide
concentration of 450 ppm would cause Greenland's ice sheet to begin to
melt faster than precipitation could replace it. 163 This study also
concludes that the earth is on track to reach this concentration by 2050.164
If emissions continue to go unchecked, the melting rate may irreversibly
overwhelming sea level rise of seven
increase in 2350 and cause an
1 65
years.
1,000
next
the
in
meters
Global warming could also spawn devastating crop failures in
Europe and Africa. European agricultural systems could suffer from
global warming, causing the Gulf Stream to shift so that it no longer
167
166
Meanwhile, serious droughts could plague Africa.
warms the area.
Some scientists believe that an observed downward trend in rainfall 1 in
68
Africa over the past twenty years directly correlates to climate change.
Africa has been slow to respond to the possibility that their agricultural
systems may have to morph to meet new challenges that the changing
climate creates. 169 The situation could result in an increase in U.S. and
European resources required to sustain the African continent. The nature
of the economic damages Kyoto avoids is slowly coming into focus.
Kyoto's proponents also argue that the agreement is more
flexible than opponents are willing to recognize. The tradable permits,
joint implementation, and clean development mechanisms reduce the
cost of meeting the nations' individual targets and the risks associated
162 CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY AFTER KYOTO,
163

supra note 13, at 32.
Global Warming Could Melt GreenlandIce Sheet - Study, Planet Ark (citing

a study by Jonathan Gregory, a meteorologist at the University of Reading,
at
England),
http://www.panetark.com/dailynewsstory.cfi/newsid/24639/story.htm.
164 Id.
165 Id.
166 CLIMATE CHANGE AND LIFE, supra note 34, at 250.
167 See Emmanuel Koro, Africa Braces for the Fallout of Global Warming,
People & the Planet, at http:// http://www.peopleandplanet.net/doc.php?id=2170
17, 2004) [hereinafter Africa Braces].
(Mar.
68
1 Id.
169 Id.
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with meeting them.17 ° The tradable permits proved to be cost effective
when they were utilized in the U.S. Clean Air Act (CAA).1 7 ' Even the
limited amount of permit trading that has occurred is estimated to have
resulted in savings of $500 million to $12 billion. 7 2 Meanwhile,
sulphate trading under the CAA saves approximately $1 billion
annually. 7 3 The joint implementation scheme will allow domestic firms
to cheaply attain reductions by investing in projects that reduce
Clean
greenhouse gas emissions in other Annex I nations.174
development mechanisms will similarly alleviate the pains of reaching
Kyoto's goals.' 75 These mechanisms give industries the viable option to
find cost-effective alternatives to reducing emission themselves and will
ease the burden on industry more than Kyoto's opponents would like to
admit.
Other factors in determining economic impact include those
significant benefits that cannot be calculated purely through economic
analysis. Recent studies indicate that even modest global warming could
result in massive species loss. 176 Such losses are economically difficult
to quantify, but there is important value even if the species itself does not
have inherent economic value. For example, consider the plight of the
170

Korea's Leading Role, supra note 93, at 215.

Id. at 210.
Id. at 209.
173 Id. at 210.
171

172
174

See Glenn Wiser, Joint Implementation: Incentives for Private Sector

Mitigation of Global Climate Change, 9 GEO. INT'L ENVT. L. REv. 747 (1997).
175 Korea's Leading Role, supra note 93, at 215. It was this mechanism that is

credited for helping convince developing nations to climb on board, because
they would benefit from the clean technology transfer. Id. at 213-15.

See Africa Braces, supra note 167; see also The Sydney Morning Herald,
Global Warming 'Threatens Earth with Mass Extinction,' available at
(June 20,
http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2003/06/19/1055828440526.html
2003); Associated Press, Global Warming Cited in Island's Shift of Wildlife
176

Numbers, Detroit News (providing that global warming may offset the balance
between moose and wolves), available at http://www.detnews.com/2004
/metro/0403/07/b06-84067.htm (on file with University of Miami International
& Comparative Law Review); cf Jeremy Lovell, Fresh Studies Support New
Mass Extinction Theory, Reuters (quoting British researcher as saying that
man's habitat destruction is the culprit in Britain's species loss and that "[i]f it

wasn't for global warming the species loss would have been even greater"), at
(Mar.
http://www.planetark.com/dailynewsstory.cftn/newsid/24346/story.htm
19, 2004).
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snail darter in Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill.'77 The U.S. Supreme
Court determined that the $100 million spent on a dam construction
project did not override the protection granted to the snail darter by the
Endangered Species Act (ESA).1 78 Congress disagreed and responded to
the decision by exempting the dam from the ESA. 79 Congress's
judgment was that the value of the dam outweighed the risk of extinction
of the small fish species. However, the historic levels of extinction
predicted by global warming extend far beyond that of a fish species. It
would be unconscionable to allow the permanent loss of multitudes of
species simply because the immediate economic costs are too great.
Kyoto's value is thus in the economic and incalculable damages it
avoids. The gravity of these potential damages compared to the costs of
implementing the flexible agreement signifies widespread ratification as
the necessary choice.
Concluding Remarks
The future of the Kyoto Protocol appears to be assured in one
primary aspect: it is not the ultimate solution to the threat of
anthropogenic climate change. Too many of the major greenhouse gas
emitters have either rejected the agreement or are without any obligation
to reduce emissions under the Protocol. However, this situation does not
signify the certain failure of future agreements developed to curb the
addition of greenhouse gases to the atmosphere. A future agreement will
have to succeed where Kyoto failed. It will have to be based on enough
scientific data to merit a genuine, as opposed to a purported, scientific
consensus that greenhouse gas emissions are likely causing temperatures
to rise, and that the damages associated with rising temperatures will be
severe. The importance of carbon to the world economy is currently too
great for truly global and substantive emission reductions to occur
without a more concrete scientific basis. Thus, intensified research on
the existence, cause, and potential effects of anthropogenic climate
change must be initiated. This research would enable government
leaders to respond confidently to the three propositions on which such an
V.
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subsequently found in other local rivers and the species is now listed as
threatened. Id.
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agreement would rely.
They will be able to conclude that the
transnational solution is based on established science, that it is a
substantive response to the global warming threat, and that it is more
economically palatable than inaction.

